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ABSTRACT: Autism has been described as a neural deficit in prediction, people with autism 
manifest low perceptual construal are impaired at traversing psychological distances, and Gilead et 
al.’s hierarchy from iconic to multimodal to fully abstract, socially communicated representations is 
exactly the hierarchy of representational impairment in autism, making autism a natural behavioural 
and neurophysiological test case for the prediction-abstraction relationship.  
Commentary on Gilead Click here to access/download;Commentary
Article;belmonte.docx
Gilead et al. lament that theories of abstract cognition have been left unintegrated in part because of 
a lack of terms of discourse common across branches of the cognitive sciences, or even between 
social and biological aspects of psychology.  There is indeed some irony in this all too lowly 
construed approach to the cognitive science of construal and abstraction, distinct threads of which 
have been appearing in the history of cognitive science for at least the past seven decades.  Our 
story begins with Witkin’s (Witkin & Asch, 1948; Witkin et al., 1962) notion of ‘field dependence’ 
in perception and psychophysics, and its subsequent relation to gestalt-orientated cognition and to 
social affiliation and perspective-taking (Witkin & Goodenough, 1977).  This same idea of a 
concrete-abstract representational axis cutting across perceptual and social aspects of cognition was 
recapitulated by Frith (1989; Frith & Happé, 1994) as ‘central coherence’ in describing both 
autism’s decontextualised detail-orientated perceptual stance and its likewise decontextualised 
egocentric social perspective.  Around the same time the idea was introduced to social psychology 
by Trope (1989) first as an account of dispositional trait versus situational state explanations of 
others’ behaviour, then extended to effects of temporal and other psychological distances on what 
Trope et al. had come to call perceptual ‘construal’ (Trope & Liberman, 2003), the term adopted in 
the rest of this commentary. 
 
The syndrome of autism, along with its dimensional extension to individual differences in autistic 
(or what Witkin called field-independent) traits, exemplifies this association between construal and 
psychological distance:  Spatial, temporal, social and hypothetical distances resurface as autistic 
differences in mapping between allocentric and egocentric space (Frith & de Vignemont, 2005; 
Hamilton et al., 2009; Pearson et al., 2014; Conson et al., 2015; Ring et al., 2018), impulsivity and 
executive disinhibition (Hill, 2004), social perspective-taking and other aspects of cognitive 
empathy (Baron-Cohen, 1995), and repetitive-behavioural aversion to unpredictability and change 
(Gomot & Wicker, 2012).   Gilead et al. relate the distinction between raw perceptual observations 
and elaborated cognitive models (abstracta) to the contrast between detail-orientated, first-person 
simulation and abstract, allocentric theory in predicting the behaviour of the world; impairment in 
prediction when constraints are underspecified, dynamic or real-time- as is the case in social 
cognition- has been identified time (Courchesne & Allen, 1997) and again (Van de Cruys et al., 
2014; Sinha et al., 2014) as a unifying feature of autism which may drive the co-occurrence of 
anxiety and rituals, perceptual dysmodulation, visuomotor deficits, slowed orienting of attention, 
and undifferentiated processing of stimuli regardless of task-relevance.  Because autistic predictions 
tend to be founded more on iconic, concrete perceptual data rather than on abstracta, they evoke 
many violations of expectation in instances where observations would match the broad strokes of an 
abstract model yet fail to match these minutiae (Van de Cruys et al., 2014).  This hyper-reliance on 
iconic representations produces a style of cognitive inference by bricolage, that is, by effortful 
construction and maintenance of complex representations and ideas bottom-up from the underlying 
details and instances (Belmonte, 2008a), which are preserved in lieu of abstracta (Belmonte, 
2008b).  This flattening of Gilead et al.’s hierarchy of abstracta implements a cognitive style adroit 
at recognising relationships amongst numerous, low-construal percepts, described by Baron-Cohen 
et al. (2009) as ‘systemising’.  Whilst it can confer superiority at detail-orientated disciplines, this 
systemising style imposes such a great cognitive representational load that it cannot scale.  Because 
predictions based on inappropriately detailed cognitive models frequently evoke mismatches with 
observations, and such errors of accidental detail are not differentiated from errors of essence (Van 
de Cruys et al., 2014), the world amounts to a constant chaos of Heraclitean flow in which one’s 
expectations are always and inexplicably wrong, sabotaging social and other domains of reward and 
thus impairing learning and development.  It’s no surprise, then, that Gilead et al.'s hierarchy of 
representational qualities- from concrete, iconic, modality-specific impressions, through multimodal 
convergences (Brandwein et al., 2013, 2015; Ostrolenk et al., 2019), to socially communicated, 
categorical abstractions (Smith et al., 2017; Stevenson et al., 2017; Beker et al., 2018; Feldman et 
al., 2018)- is exactly the hierarchy of perceptual and representational abnormality in autism. 
 
All this evidence shows Gilead et al.’s ontology of abstraction and prediction to be consistent with 
historical concepts and findings, and with what we know about autism, its prime test case.  But 
retrospection is the game of Monday-morning quarterbacks- what of prospective predictions, and 
experiments yet to be performed?  Drawing together all these strands can relate behavioural and 
neural aspects of prediction and abstraction, psychological distance and construal, with corollary 
implications for cultural and sex differences in cognition:  Gilead et al. speculatively peg the 
default-mode network as the home of their cognitive abstracta, although the true locus may lie 
rather in this network’s interactions with other control networks.  The default-mode network is 
constitutively active in autism (Kennedy et al., 2006), perhaps reflecting constant and largely 
fruitless attempts at predictive modelling (Raichle, 2015) of accidental detail, associated with low-
construal impulsive action (Shannon et al., 2011) and anxious affect (Simpson et al., 2001ab). 
 
The female advantage in default-mode network deactivation in reward contexts (Dumais et al., 
2018) seems consistent with autism’s association with male-typical cognition (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2005), linking construal to cognitive sex differences.  And Witkin (1979) himself noted that 
construal variations can be a function of culture; indeed individualistic cultures are associated with 
a more systemising bias (Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) and collectivistic 
cultures with higher construal (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Boduroglu et al., 2009).  One might 
predict, then, associations of individual trait construal level (a.k.a. autistic traits, field dependence), 
situational state construal level, sex and/or gender, and individualistic/collectivistic culture with the 
frequency and/or duration of dynamic coupling of default-mode with attentional and executive 
control networks (Ryali et al., 2016).  The degree of network coupling would reflect individual and 
situational differences in the bias and range of model-driven feedback versus environmentally 
bound feedforward cognitive control of perception, action, and affect, and would be measurable 
with fMRI, or perhaps EEG/MEG (Kitzbichler et al., 2015).  Such a study would afford an 
opportunity to reconstrue (as it were!) as a neurophysiological variable the diversity with which 
individual humans walk the tightrope between Aristotelian category and Heraclitean instance, 
between Lacan’s (1966) le symbole and la chose. 
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